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Abstract
The paper studies the problem of securely storing biometric passwords, such as fingerprints and irises.
With the help of coding theory Juels and Wattenberg derived in 1999 a scheme where similar input
strings will be accepted as the same biometric. In the same time nothing could be learned from the
stored data. They called their scheme a fuzzy commitment scheme. In this paper we will revisit the
solution of Juels and Wattenberg and we will provide answers to two important questions: what type of
error-correcting codes should be used and what happens if biometric templates are not uniformly
distributed, i.e. the biometric data come with redundancy. Answering the first question will lead us to
the search for low-rate large-minimum distance error-correcting codes which come with efficient
decoding algorithms up to the designed distance. In order to answer the second question we relate the
rate required with a quantity connected to the “entropy” of the string, trying to estimate a sort of
“capacity”, if we want to see a flavor of the converse of Shannon's noisy coding theorem. Finally we
deal with side-problems arising in a practical implementation and we propose a possible solution to the
main one that seems to have so far prevented in many situations real life applications of the fuzzy
scheme.
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Abstract—The paper studies the problem of securely storing
biometric passwords, such as fingerprints and irises. With the
help of coding theory Juels and Wattenberg derived in 1999 a
scheme where similar input strings will be accepted as the same
biometric. In the same time nothing could be learned from the
stored data. They called their scheme a fuzzy commitment scheme.
In this paper we will revisit the solution of Juels and Watten-
berg and we will provide answers to two important questions:
what type of error-correcting codes should be used and what
happens if biometric templates are not uniformly distributed, i.e.
the biometric data come with redundancy.
Answering the first question will lead us to the search for low-
rate large-minimum distance error-correcting codes which come
with efficient decoding algorithms up to the designed distance.
In order to answer the second question we relate the rate
required with a quantity connected to the “entropy” of the string,
trying to estimate a sort of “capacity”, if we want to see a flavor
of the converse of Shannon’s noisy coding theorem.
Finally we deal with side-problems arising in a practical
implementation and we propose a possible solution to the main
one that seems to have so far prevented in many situations real
life applications of the fuzzy scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally passwords for access to a computer are not
stored in plain-text but rather as images under a hash function.
Hash functions have the property that they can easily be
computed for any input string but it is computationally not
feasible to compute any pre-image of a given image point.
Usually it is also desirable that hash functions are ‘collision
resistant’, this means it is computationally not feasible to come
up with two different input strings which are mapped to the
same hash values. Because of the last property standard hash
functions such as SHA-1 are not suitable to store biometric
data. What we would need is a hash function having the
property that similar input strings will result in the same
hash values. Until recently no good scheme has been known
and many practical systems store biometric data such as
fingerprints to access a personal computer in plain-text.
Martinian, Yekhanin and Yedidia [1] call the problem at
hand the secure biometric storage problem. The problem arises
when biometrics such as fingerprints and irises are used instead
of passwords. It is desirable for security reasons that the
biometric data is not stored in plain-text on a storage device
but rather in encrypted form. When a user wants to access the
system the access device should grant access as long as two
biometrics do not differ by more than a certain amount of bits.
In the literature there are several schemes which use ideas
from coding theory to tackle the secure biometric storage
problem. According to the authors of [1] the first solution was
proposed by Davida, Frankel and Matt in [2]. In their own
paper [1] Martinian et. al. propose an information theoretic
solution based on the Slepian-Wolf theorem. This system
has the property that the biometric is securely stored, it has
however the disadvantage that a person who has access to the
stored data and the implemented algorithm can compute a bit
string which will provide access to the system even though
the bit string is not close to any biometric data.
In this paper we will be concerned with an algorithm first
proposed by Juels and Wattenberg [3]. Also this system makes
heavily use of coding theory.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we
revisit the algorithm of Juels and Wattenberg. The original
paper [3] leaves two important questions open. First what are
good practical codes to be used having very large block length
and which provide the robustness and security level required
for the secure biometric storage problem. We provide answers
to this problem in Section III. The second question arises when
the possible biometric bit-strings are not uniformly distributed.
Of course this is an important issue as all practical systems
are suffering this problem. We will address this problem in
Section IV. Section V and Section VI are finally devoted to
some practical implementation issues.
II. THE FUZZY COMMITMENT SCHEME OF JUELS AND
WATTENBERG
Juels and Wattenberg [3] proposed a ‘fuzzy commitment
scheme’ capable of storing biometric data in binary form. In
this section we describe the scheme for data over a general
alphabet and we derive a strengthened theorem.
Let F = Fq be a finite field. We assume that the biometric
data is given in form of a vector b ∈ Fn. Assume C ⊂ Fn is
an [n, k, d] linear code and distance d is given by
d = 2t + 1.
We also assume that there is an efficient decoding algorithm
capable of decoding up to t errors.
Let h : Fn −→ Fl be a hash function. In particular h
should be collision resistant and it should be computationally
not feasible to compute an x ∈ h−1(y) for any y ∈ Fl.
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Let b ∈ Fn be the biometric one wants to store on the
computer. The algorithm requires to select a random code word
rb ∈ C. The system then computes the vector
l := b− rb
and stores on the system:
(h(rb), l).
The following is a strengthening of the main theorem in [3].
Theorem 1: If the possible biometrics b ∈ Fn are uniformly
distributed then computing the biometric b ∈ Fn from the
stored data (h(rb), l) is computationally equivalent to invert
the ‘restricted’ hash function
h |C : C −→ F
l.
Proof: Since b and rb were selected independently and
uniformly at random the vector l := b − rb reveals no
information about the random choice of rb ∈ C. An attacker
is left with the task to compute rb from h(rb).
The theorem provides the means to come up with a practical
secure storage system once we can assume that the biometrics
are uniformly distributed over the ambient space Fn. If this is
the case and if h is a hash function which is practically secure
then we only have to require that the size of the code |C| ≥
280. This is due to the fact that it is generally accepted that a
total search space of 280 is beyond the capabilities of modern
computers. As a result it is desirable that codes constructed
over the binary field have dimension k = dim C ≥ 80.
The following lemma shows that the system allows to accept
an authorized user as soon as this user provides a biometric
vector which comes close enough to the originally supplied
vector b ∈ Fn.
Lemma 2: Let b˜ ∈ Fn be a vector whose Hamming distance
satisfies:
dH(b, b˜) ≤ t.
Then it is possible to efficiently compute b from the stored data
(h(rb), l). (In fact authorization is granted by comparing the
hash stored with the hash of the decoded codeword, without
any need to compute b.)
Proof:
dH(rb, b˜− l) = dH(b− l, b˜− l) = dH(b, b˜) ≤ t.
The vector b˜− l decodes by assumption uniquely to the code
vector rb. Knowing rb and l is equivalent to knowing b.
Several considerations are due at this moment, starting with
the choice of the code to use.
In [3] it is proposed that Reed-Solomon and BCH codes
might provide useful results (see also [4]). We believe these
are not necessarily good options for two reasons. First practical
biometric systems have often to deal with large amount of bits;
we can consider 100′000 bits as a crude estimate just as an
example, although this may vary a lot in dependance of the
biometric used. Moreover we can say an error tolerance of
10% of errors is a reasonable requirement, although here too
it can be much more or sometimes less. BCH codes of block
length 105 and distance 20′000 are necessarily of very low
rate and it is practically not feasible to run e.g. a Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm once so many syndromes are involved.
The next section addresses the choice of the code.
III. CHOICE OF THE CODE
Based on the comments in the last section we require an
[n, k, d] linear code whose dimension is k ≥ 80 over the binary
field, possibly smaller if one works over larger alphabets. In
addition one wants to have a large relative minimum distance
that only low rate codes can afford. Indeed because e.g. of
the asymptotic Elias upper bound (see e.g. [5]) only very low
rate binary codes can have relative distance larger than e.g.
0.4. Of course the code should come with efficient decoding
algorithms even when the block length is about n = 105.
We think of two types of codes as possible candidates for
this application, namely 1) Product codes, and 2) LDPC codes.
Both these codes can be decoded with linear or close to linear
complexity in the block length.
Let us consider the first option: product of classical codes.
We can define them using the generator matrices (see e.g. [6]):
If A and B are the generator matrices of two codes, C1 and
C2, with parameters (n1, k1, d1) and (n2, k2, d2), then the
Kronecker product of matrices
A⊗B = (aijB)
obtained by replacing every entry aij of A by aijB is the
generator matrix of the product code.
The new code has parameters (n1n2, k1k2, d1d2) and can be
viewed as the set of all codewords consisting of n1×n2 arrays
constructed in such a way that every column is a codeword of
the first code and every row is a codeword of the second one.
Clearly, given the definition of the product of two codes,
the product of more than two codes can be defined as well.
We give here some examples of product of two codes with
parameters getting close to (100000, 100, 20000):
• (512, 98, 93), a classical Goppa code and (200, 1, 200), a
repetition code.
• (121, 49, 37), an extended Goppa code [7] and
(825, 2, 550), where codewords are the all-zero
codeword, two codewords with respectively the first and
the last 275 bits equal to ones and the other zeroes, and
the sum of these two;
• (144, 50, 48), an extended Goppa code and (693, 2, 462),
where codewords are the all-zero codeword, two code-
words with respectively the first and the last 231 bits
equal to ones and the other zeroes, and the sum of these
two;
• (256, 26, 116), an extended Goppa code and
(400, 4, 200), an (8,4,4) extended Hamming code
with each symbol repeated 50 times.
The decoding procedure of such product codes is based
on iterative algorithms, where one decodes alternatively by
columns and by rows (see also [8]–[10]). Thanks to this kind
of splitting in the decoding, we can afford to use classical
codes such as Goppa codes, while maintaining a reasonable
computational complexity.
Since the first version of our paper was made available at
the arXiv a similar choice of coding scheme was proposed
in [11].
As for LDPC codes, the difficulty seems mainly that of
finding the parameters we need. Codes studied in the literature
often aim at rates of 1/2 or higher. Such codes necessarily have
a relatively poor relative minimum distance
Among the many constructions in the literature, we believe
that RA, IRA and eIRA codes (see for example [13], [14])
should be good candidates with this respect. We have also
taken into consideration the use of algebraic constructions of
LDPC codes, such as the Margulis-Ramanujan type [15]: in
this case we should modify the construction to lower the rate,
for example by taking m + 1 copies of the graph on the left
and m on the right for a suitable m, but we face the difficulty
of finding a good minimum distance [16].
Actually turbo codes could be a better option for a low
rate; though in more pratical scenarios, as we will see in next
section, such low rates are not convenient anymore for security
reasons and more standard parameters suit better.
IV. DISTRIBUTION OF BIOMETRIC TEMPLATES
Theorem 1 works under the strong assumption that the
biometric data is uniformly and randomly distributed over
the ambient space Fn. In practical applications this is a very
unlikely scenario. In this section we estimate a threshold for
the dimension k of the code, above which the commitment
scheme of Juels and Wattenberg is most probably secure.
First note that if one has some information about the bio-
metric b it will be possible to recover from l some information
about rb. Dependent on the size of C it might be possible to
do a search among all codewords with a particular pattern and
consequently break the system. To possibly defend the system
from this attack, one could essentially take a higher rate code
(but at the expense of lowering the minimum distance). So our
next step is to relate the uncertainty or randomness connected
to the string with the dimension required for the code.
Following [17], we can speak of the entropy of a binary
string as the log in base 2 of the number of possible strings:
so, for example, for a binary string of length n, where each
bit is chosen independently and randomly between 0 and 1,
the entropy is defined to be n and it is measured in units of
information or Shannon bits (see e.g. [18]). If the string is
not random, the entropy is the log of the number of the so
called typical sequences; if, for example, each bit is chosen
independently to be 1 with probability p and 0 with probability
1− p, then the entropy of the string is nh(p), where h(p) =
−[p log p + q log q] is the Shannon function.
Now, let H(b) be the entropy of the biometric. If that is n,
that means that biometrics are randomly distributed, then we
can afford a code with dimension k = k0 (k0 = 100, say).
When the distribution is not really random, then the “number
of possible strings” is reduced from 2n to 2H(b).
So, roughly speaking, it is like the eavesdropper Eve knows
the correct bit at n − H(b) positions, so that if we want her
to search nevertheless among 2k0 codewords, then, counting
in the worst case over all possible strings for those positions,
we should need 2k0 · 2(n−H(b)) codewords, i.e. the dimension
should be
k ≥ k0 + (n−H(b)).
Clearly, as said, we are considering a worst case scenario,
so that this requirement makes sense for, let’s say, reasonable
values of the parameters, that is for example k0 << H(b);
otherwise k could be asked to be even larger than n. Essen-
tially our requirement is purposely asking a bit too much than
the strict minimum, which though doesn’t waste at all in a
security concern.
To see the issue from another view point, we can think of
a channel, where at one side we have the message rb and at
the other end Eve tries to decode and get rb from the pair
H(rb), l. The converse of Shannon’s noisy coding theorem
says that the probability of correct decoding can be bounded
as 2−nG(R) where G(R) is a positive function of the rate R
for R > C. So in some sense we have estimated the capacity
of this channel as k0
n
+ 1− H(b)
n
.
(For references on information theory, Shannon’s noisy
coding theorem and its converse [19]–[23].)
V. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
The fact that the fuzzy scheme, in its original form as
described above, has not found yet, as far as we know, so
many real applications in biometric storage, depends not only
in the way of implementing it as we have discussed it so far,
but also in further practical difficulties that make the problem
more complicated than how we stated it.
The main problem to overcome is the fact that the scheme
requires that the two passwords to be compared are prealigned;
and the difficulty consists in aligning with a password that is
not in the clear. There are also some other aspects one has to
improve or fix; for example one has to take into account the
possibility of erasures and unordered collection of biometric
features. The error distribution is also far from uniform in
practical schemes.
In the literature [24]–[32] we can find a deeper discussion
of all these side problems together with proposals to attack
some of them, each of them with its pros and cons. In the
following section we propose another way of dealing with it,
i.e. we propose to use, instead of biometrics, some particular
histograms derived from them that can capture important
features of the images. As a side effect, since these histograms
are also a means of compression, we would obtain smaller
lengths for the passwords to be hashed and also we wouldn’t
need to require such a high minimum distance. So looking
for different and more convenient code parameters could be a
relevant consequence.
VI. HISTOGRAMS AND ALIGNMENT
What we essentially want to do to solve the pre-alignment
problem is to somehow transform the biometric passwords and
store the output of the transformation. What we first require
from this “function” is to be resistant to noise, changes in illu-
mination and transformations such as translation and rotation.
The literature [33]–[35] indicates that the so called “multires-
olution histograms”, that are sets of intensity histograms of an
image at multiple image resolution, satisfy these prerequisites.
So they could possibly solve our problem, but we require
another important feature, i.e. we want the transformation to
be one-to-one or at least that not too many different biometrics
give the same output. Pass and Zabih [36], [37] worked in this
direction and introduced the notions of histogram refinement
and joint histograms. We believe that some transformation of
this kind that encompasses these features could be a solution
to overcome the problem of alignment. And also new issues
would consequently follow: the size of error tolerance required
(that would be much reduced) and the choice of other suitable
code parameters.
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